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 3 
Introduction	  
But the harder the Wind blew down the road, the tighter the shivering man clung to his coat. Then, 
the Sun came out from behind a cloud. Sun warmed the air and the frosty ground. The man on the 
road unbuttoned his coat. The Sun grew slowly brighter and brighter. Soon the man felt so hot, he 
took off his coat and sat down in a shady spot. "How did you do that?" said the Wind. "It was easy," 
said the Sun, "I lit the day. Through gentleness I got my way."  
(Attributed to Aesop). 
 
The MI5 deem the contemporary threat of international terrorism for the United Kingdom as 
“severe” (MI5 “Terrorism”), while in Denmark the threat has been perceived as “significant”(PET 
2014); both these countries claim that the biggest threat comes from Syria and Iraq due to the 
current events involving militant Islamist groups of the Islamic State and Jabhat al-Nusra (PET 
2014; MI5 “Terrorism”). In Denmark as many as 100 citizens have left the country while in the 
U.K. over 400 have already left British shores (Barret 12); these foreign fighters are seen as a threat 
to their home-countries both abroad and on their return. While abroad, they can provide the 
extremist organisations in the country of destination and their home-countries with information 
through a communication line because of their language skills (MI5 “Foreign Fighters”). When the 
foreign fighters return they pose a threat due to the possibility of acquired military skills and the 
promotion of radicalisation (ibid.). While the U.K. is known for its’ “hard” approach to terrorism 
(Paulussen and van Waal 2014; Silverman 2015; Bora 2014), Denmark is implementing a “soft” 
approach (Sheikh 2014; Hooper 2014; Zawadski and Matzen 2015), therefore my research question 
will be “What are the underlying paradigms of programmes approaching militant Islamists 
returning from Syria and Iraq? An analysis of the United Kingdom and Denmark” 
 
David Rapoport argues that terrorism is not a new phenomenon, as the first wave of 
organised terrorism can be tracked back to the anarchists in the 1880s; even the religious wave from 
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1979 onwards should no longer been seen as a recent development (2002). However, the 
declaration of George W. Bush of a “War on Terror” after the attack on the Twin Towers in the 
United States (Bush 2001) changed the political landscape considerably, turning this war truly 
global in its scope (United Kingdom Home Department 2006). The history of Western countries in 
the Middle East, and the manner of the war that followed was waged, largely counts for the reason 
why fundamentalist extremist organisations like the Islamic State or Jabhat al- Nusra enjoy the 
popularity they do, as shown by the number of foreign fighters joining them (Economist 2014). In 
order to deal with the attraction these organisations have on young Muslims, several counter-
terrorism programmes focussing on preventing terrorist attacks and de-radicalising or disengaging 
terrorists were adopted, by the United Kingdom in 2003 (United Kingdom Home Department 2006) 
and Denmark in 2002 (Council of Europe 2007).  
The relevance of this research concerns the very basis of a sovereign government; this is 
best illustrated by the Rousseaun concept of the Social Contract, where every man has the same 
rights and duties and the state has the sole right to violence as they protect the citizens from and for 
the state (Gourevitch et al. 63). When a state is not protecting its citizens equally, or when it is 
harming its citizens, the social contract falls apart and can result in the citizens reverting to violence 
against the state. I will conclude my thesis by arguing that the British and Danish government are 
not holding their end of the social contract, which will contribute to the divide between the foreign 
fighters and the British and Danish government. 
Following the introduction, the first chapter will introduce the definitions, discuss my 
methodology and will entail a literature review; this will be followed by my second chapter which 
will discuss the programmes concerning foreign fighters in the United Kingdom and Denmark. I 
will discuss what the most important aspects are in the programmes, e.g. is the programme focussed 
on punishment or reintegration? Does it involve the family and community? What is the 
terminology used and what are the possible underlying assumptions of their choice of words? In the 
third chapter an analysis of the findings will be conducted for the two programmes in order to find 
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out the main differences, or similarities, concerning the foreign fighters returning from Syria and 
Iraq. The answers to these questions will help in locating the weaknesses and strengths in the 
counter-terrorism efforts and will help optimising these in order to eliminate terrorism as a means to 
an end in the political arena. 
I. What	  is	  it	  I’m	  researching	  and	  how	  am	  I	  planning	  to	  do	  it?	  
“What could governments and other actors do to make this disengagement from terrorism happen – 
sooner rather than later, before they have caused so much violence and suffering?” (Bjorgo and 
Horgan 1)  
Definitions	  
The ambiguity surrounding some of the key definitions in the field of terrorism and counter 
terrorism requires these terms to be explicitly stated here. Adam Schmid concludes, after 
researching eighty-eight different definitions of a terrorist, that a terrorist is “an individual using 
illegal terrorising measures to intimidate civilians or states in order to coerce the government in the 
doing or abstaining of a particular act.”(36). The militant Islamic organisations active in Syria and 
Iraq, such as the Islamic State and Jabhat al-Nusra, conform to this definition as they are a 
collection of individuals trying to persuade Bashar al-Assad, the U.S., the U.K. or Denmark, etc. 
(Naik et al. 2014), into supporting their objective of the creation of an Islamic State. Consequently, 
the foreign fighters that travel from their home-countries to join these organisations are seen as 
terrorists. The foreign fighter conforms to this definition with the addition that they are fighting in a 
country that is not their home-country.  
 I base my definitions of disengagement, de-radicalisation, etc. on John Horgan’s 
work, as he defined several clear, relevant problems in the field of terrorism and counter-terrorism 
and has criticised the interchangeable use of different terms such as “desertion," "demobilisation," 
"defection," "de-escalation," "rehabilitation,”  “disengagement” and “de-radicalisation” 
(“Deradicalization or Disengagement?” 7), claiming that all these programmes have slightly 
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different nuances and assumptions as to how disengagement should occur, but that disengagement 
is essentially all they want. He defines the two main terms in the field, “de-radicalisation” and 
“disengagement” (ibid. 1). De-radicalisation concerns a change of values and ideals, a change of 
views and opinion, disengagement however concerns leaving terrorism, violence as a means to an 
end, but not necessarily changing the ideology. Horgan identifies a difference between physical 
disengagement, e.g. a foreign fighter in prison will not be able to engage in terrorism, and 
psychological disengagement, which is the condemning of violence to promote a cause (ibid. 5).I 
have chosen to follow his definition as he is a prominent scholar in the field of terrorism and 
counter-terrorism and has produced ground-breaking work. 
Methodology	  
To make the research concise and of pragmatic value, in this thesis I discuss the disengagement 
efforts of the United Kingdom and Denmark whilst using the literature review as background 
information to the field. The programmes of both the U.K. and Denmark are readily available on the 
Internet and are the primary sources used for this research. The case studies will be thoroughly 
analysed and will constitute the main part of this thesis. For these case studies of the United 
Kingdom and Denmark, I research the British and Danish programmes’ different components, as 
well as examining how each refers to key aspects through their chosen terminology in order to 
discern an underlying framework in which these programmes have been developed and are 
implemented. I have put together these components by analysing other existing disengagement 
programmes in Yemen, Saudi Arabia and in the Netherlands and I have included the terminology as 
Richard Jackson writes in his book Writing the War on Terrorism: Language, Politics and Counter-
terrorism that language is an important tool in waging a war. Jackson shows how the American 
government has used language and a careful selection of words in the “War on Terror”, from 9/11 
onwards, in order to construct a whole new world for its citizens; a world where terrorists are not 
their fellow citizens anymore but a threat to everything they hold dear (2005); research into 
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terminology was therefore also required to be performed on the case studies of the U.K. and 
Denmark. 
The components that will be researched can point to the two different, or shared, assumptions of 
a hard and soft approach to the foreign fighter when they return. I investigate whether the British 
and Danish governments want to reintegrate the returning foreign fighter or whether it sees the 
returning foreign fighter as a security threat and mainly focusses on physical disengagement 
through penalising the homebound foreign fighters. I will do so by looking at whether the 
programmes focus on certain components, which I have structured in the following table: 
 
Component Purpose of investigation 
Reintegration Does the programme focus on reintegration? 
Punishment Is the focus of the programme on penalising 
returning foreign fighters? 
Isolation As soon as the foreign fighter returns is the 
individual isolated? Is there a special terrorist 
section in prison? 
Family Is the family an important factor in the 
disengagement as it is in the Dutch and Saudi 
Arabian disengagement programmes? (Hussain 
et al. 2015; Actie Programma 2014) 
(Religious) community Is the (religious) community taken into account 
in disengaging the foreign fighter? If so, how? 
Surveillance Does the foreign fighter need to undergo 
surveillance? If so, how and for how long? 
E.g. In Saudi Arabia family has part of the 
responsibility of monitoring the subject (Hussain 
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et al. 2015). 
Dialogue Is dialogue important in order to construct a 
counter-narrative for the individual, as it is in 
Yemen and Saudi Arabia? (Birk 3) 
Therapy Is there a possibility of therapy – including art, 
music, etc. - for the returning foreign fighter? 
Education Is education an important factor in changing the 
ideological learnings of the subject? 
E.g. In Saudi Arabia the individual gets to take 
classes in sport, culture, history, etc. 
Finances Is there a possibility of financial support for the 
subject or will the financial assets be frozen, 
after the example of the Saudi Arabian and the 
Dutch programme, respectively (Porges 2010; 
Actie Programma 2014) 
After care Is there a pragmatic approach for the foreign 
fighter when the individual leaves the 
disengagement programme, such as a residence, 
income and a routine through a job or study? 
Terminology What terminology has been used in the 
disengagement programmes and what biases or 
underlying assumptions does that point at? 
 
After surveying each country, I offer a comparative analysis using theoretical frameworks of, 
amongst others, the Social Contract Theory of Rousseau, the Modern Racism Theory of Balibar and 
the conditional citizens of McGhee to analyse their underlying frameworks.  
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A	  Critical	  Review	  of	  the	  Literature	  on	  De-­‐radicalisation	  and	  Disengagement	  Programmes	  	  
The majority of  the contemporary research concerns how foreign fighters, as defined previously, 
have been radicalised, with models created to explain the radicalisation process (see Kruglanski and 
Webber 2002; Horgan The psychology of terrorism; Torok 2013); however, due to its contemporary 
character, the literature lacks in-depth research of occurrences following  their return to their home-
country. I have divided the research that does exist on these matters, into a short historical and 
geographical section, giving a broader context and a section about the other disengagement 
programmes that have been analysed for more specific context. I show that some programmes and 
the results of counter-terrorism efforts have been analysed, but that there is a lack of research into 
the biases and underlying paradigms of these packages.  
 
Historical and Geographical Context 
Historical and geographical context is crucial in creating an in-depth understanding of the situation, 
especially for a topic with as many variables and as complicated as this. Crystal St-Denis has 
written her dissertation on the history of disengagement programmes in France, Germany, the 
Netherlands, Denmark and Spain as these countries are all actively engaged in producing counter 
narratives to militant Jihadism. St-Denis’ work is important, however, her scope is too large as she 
finishes with very broad recommendations at the end of her paper, which do not have a pragmatic 
value for countries to improve their disengagement programmes for returning foreign fighters 
(2014).  
Vidhya Ramalingam’s article can serve to put the specific problem of foreign fighters into a 
broader perspective as she analyses far-right extremism across Europe. She shows that far-right 
extremism, such as militant Islamism, is an old threat and argues for the need of additional research 
as she identifies challenges such as a lack of a definition, lack of data and lack of awareness as 
contributing factors to the problem. Again, the scope of the policy paper is too large, since it 
considers far–right extremism as a whole, across a whole continent (2014). However, in addressing 
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the challenges that the field faces,  John Horgan and Kurt Braddock would agree with Ramalingam 
as they point out the challenges in assessing the effectiveness of disengagement programmes after a 
one-year pilot they undertook (“Rehabilitating the Terrorists?”).  Neither of these articles provides 
an in-depth study of what is being done to counter far-right extremism or give a pragmatic 
suggestion for what should be done. The problems with far-right extremism concerning foreign 
fighters are addressed in disengagement programmes, of which the next section discusses. 
 
Disengagement Programmes 
The literature that discusses far right extremism and radicalisation as a whole is limited, particularly 
so for those analysing disengagement programmes. Great Britain and Denmark differ greatly in 
their response to returning foreign fighters. In order to gain cooperation amongst countries, a 
general consensus about the disengagement programmes should be reached; this thesis, therefore, 
will assess the strengths and weaknesses of the British and Danish programmes in order to further 
this objective. The programme of Denmark can be considered a soft approach to militant Islamists 
and has been simultaneously criticised and praised for its unique approach (Sheikh 2014; Hooper 
2014; Zawadski and Matzen 2015). The British approach to militant Jihadism has publicly been 
labelled as harsh, primitive, but also as necessary (Paulussen and van Waal 2014; Silverman 2015; 
Bora 2014), so what has been claimed about other disengagement programmes already researched? 
Marc Jones, who wrote his dissertation on rehabilitating Islamic extremists while they are in 
prison, favours a soft and locally focussed approach to foreign fighters. He conducted a 
comparative analysis of de-radicalisation programmes in Saudi Arabia, Yemen and Malaysia and 
found that family inclusion and (religious) re-education are part of the “success – factors” in the 
Middle Eastern programmes (2013). He, together with other scholars such as Michelle Bentley 
(2015), Phil Edwards (2015) and Daniel Byman and Jeremy Shapiro (2006), would agree with 
Denmark’s focus on reintegration. Oppositely, after analysing Indonesia, Algeria and Saudi Arabia, 
Roel Meijer et al. concluded that the combination of the hard and the soft approach is the best 
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option for stable results in the long run (2012). Richard Barret and Jytte Klausen would agree with 
Meijer, as Barret, after his analysis of Algeria and Saudi Arabia, claims that monitoring the 
returning foreign fighters is important, however, help of the community is key in mitigating the 
threat of foreign fighters (2014) and Jytte Klausen in her article “British Counter-Terrorism After 
7/7”, argues for a “tough love” approach (2009).  
This tough love approach, however, can be counterproductive as Cortright et al. in their 
report “Friend not Foe”, analysed several counter-terrorism strategies and discovered overly 
militarised, intensified state repression and human rights abuse, such as freedom of expression, 
association and assembly. These consequences are due to the fear for the threat the terrorists and 
foreign fighters could possibly pose on society (2006). This phenomenon is not unknown as, Marcel 
ten Hooven, for example, discusses the dangers of the expanding authoritarian powers in the name 
of terrorism (2014). Wardell, in addressing the dangers of this occurring, highlights David 
Cameron’s implementation of new strict counter terrorism measures giving new powers to the 
police to: “to seize passports to stop suspects travelling abroad and to stop British nationals 
returning unless they submit to screening processes” (2014). Bradley Bamford takes this a step 
further and warns for the movement of emergency measures into structural changes within the 
intelligence community, etc. which would have far-reaching consequences for civil liberties and 
rights in the long run (2010). This over-militarisation and securitisation might be a consequence of 
the ‘us’ and ‘them’ paradigm Reza Aslan discuses in his book How to win a Cosmic War, as he 
argues for moderate Islamist groups to be admitted to the political system (2009). These articles 
highlight the importance of researching what is being done in the name of counter-terrorism and 
what the motives are behind it in order to make the counter-terrorism efforts as efficient as possible. 
Additionally, Anna Oehmichen analyses the counter-terrorism measures of Spain, France, 
Great Britain and Germany, concluding that in all four of the countries, human rights were blatantly 
ignored in the name of the “War on Terror”, since there has been a construct of a continuous 
security threat. Returning foreign fighters will only heighten this threat of terrorism and citizens 
 12 
will call for harsher measures, to secure their own safety, even when that interferes with the human 
rights of the suspects (2009). It is, therefore, important to analyse the disengagement programmes 
implemented by the U.K and Denmark as human rights abuse is not going to benefit either of the 
parties and an optimised disengagement programme will accelerate the elimination of violence as a 
means to a political end. 
II. Analysing	  the	  disengagement	  packages	  of	  the	  United	  Kingdom	  and	  
Denmark	  
“’Once a terrorist, always a terrorist.’ So goes conventional wisdom.” (Bjorgo and Horgan 1) 
 
The British counter-terrorism package works at several levels: CONTEST is the umbrella 
programme for counter-terrorism efforts in general; it has four “strands”: Pursue, Prevent, Protect 
and Prepare (Rabasa et al. 126). The Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism (OSCT), which is 
part of the British Home Office, is responsible for CONTEST and is the Government’s lead unit on 
counter-terrorism. The Prevent strand is the section which focusses specifically on the countering of 
radicalisation (Project CONTEST 3). However, the government also makes use of locally set up 
disengagement programmes such as the ‘Al Furqan’, the ‘Healthy Identities Intervention’ and the 
‘Channel’ programme, the last of which was instituted by the British government (Whitehead 
2014). Channel involves several agencies working together to give individuals access to services 
such as health care and education, specialist mentoring and diversionary activities (Counter-
Terrorism Prevent 2015). Making use of these local programmes fits well in the “Big Society” 
programme, introduced in 2010 (Briggs 971), in which the government expresses its desire to place 
more power in the hand of the people, the citizens, as opposed to centralised power in the hands of 
the government. As the Prevent strand of the CONTEST programme and the Channel 
disengagement programme concern the British counter radicalisation efforts, these have been 
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constructed by the government, this part of the counter-terrorism programmes of the United 
Kingdom is most relevant to this research and will therefore be the main focus of the analysis.  
The Danish counter-terrorism efforts are set up in a similar way to the British system. For 
the different aspects of the threats posed by terrorism, Denmark has set up sub-programmes to focus 
on specific threats in order to bundle the knowledge of experts into specific and appropriate 
directions. “A Common and Safe Future” is an umbrella programme that was introduced by the 
government to stop people from radicalising; the first edition was published in 2005 and a revised 
version was published in 2009 (Project Denmark 1). Denmark recognises that foreign fighters are 
not their only threat and that they may have some characteristics in common with gang-members; 
therefore the “Common and Safe Future” plan also draws upon earlier gang-research (Government 
of Denmark “Common and Safe Future” 4). In prisons, the Danish government has set up a special 
three yearlong de-radicalisation programme called “Back on Track” (Project Denmark 7). Similarly 
to the British government, the Danish government works together with local parties such as the 
ground-breaking Aarhus initiative; an initiative by the mayor of the second-biggest city in 
Denmark, which deals with returning foreign fighters (Higgins), it is a pilot programme, which has 
national potential depending on its success. Additionally, Denmark actively engages in international 
military fights such as the French- led intervention of Mali and the support it gives to the U.S.-led 
coalition against ISIS (Project Denmark 7). The programmes of both the countries will be analysed 
by looking at the following components; first of all, I will analyse whether the government focusses 
on punishment and subsequently whether the foreign fighter is subjected to isolation, or 
reintegration.  Secondly, within the approach of punishment or reintegration I will analyse whether 
family and (religious) community play a role, as these components were seen as “success-factors” 
in earlier research (Jones 2013). Thirdly, in order to manage the risk of the foreign fighters  
surveillance is an important aspect in the process of returning and will be analysed as well. 
Additionally, dialogue, therapy,, education,, finances and aftercare will be discussed and lastly, I 
will analyse the  terminology throughout the programmes..  
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Punishment	  or	  Reintegration?	  
First of all, it is important to analyse whether the programmes focus on punishment or reintegration 
in order to analyse the underlying paradigms. For the U.K. the punishment of violent extremists is 
addressed in a separate section of the CONTEST programme, in the strand Pursue. The U.K.’s 
government’s aim is to become aware of threats of terrorist attacks as early as possible. 
Subsequently, they aim to disturb the terrorists in their planning and execution of the terrorist attack 
and whether the terrorist attack was carried out or not, the British government wants to prosecute 
and where possible, deport them (Counter-Terrorism Pursue 2014). Pursue has been growing 
considerably as the number of police officers and staff concerned with Counter-Terrorism efforts 
has risen by more than a third since 2006 (Project CONTEST 70). In the ninth report about project 
CONTEST, it is shown that the success of the Pursue strand is measured through, amongst other 
factors, the high conviction rate; the conviction rate in 2008 was 83% (Project CONTEST 70). This 
is a worrying choice of measurement of the success of a programme, as this increases the possibility 
of wrongful persecution. When the governmental institutions will be pressured in locking up as 
many arrested people as possible, the police will channel this pressure towards their suspect in order 
to obtain confessions, as confessions are still the highest aim for the police to prove the guilt of a 
suspect (Huff and Killias 224). Huff and Killias have done research into the wrongful persecution in 
Great Britain and claim that the high-pressure police forces exercise on their suspect and the 
accepted practice of convincing them to confess “obviously favours false confessions” (224). 
Besides this focus on ‘not yet’ actions, ‘pre-crime’ prosecution and the high conviction rate, the 
U.K. is considering an additional penalising possibility and plans to prosecute the foreign fighters 
for treason when they return (Morris 2014). This would be the first time this has occurred since the 
end of World War II and clearly serves as a discouraging factor for foreign fighters to return to the 
United Kingdom; this in turn, will enlarge the division between the government and the violent 
extremists and will give them more ground for anger, which subsequently will make the challenge 
of disengaging foreign fighters even more difficult and poses the question of whether the purpose of 
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the British programme is: punishment, a short term solution under pressure of the people 
(Oehmichen 2009), or reintegration, a focus on a long term solution?   
Isolation in the United Kingdom 
When a foreign fighter returns and has been convicted of these crimes, the United Kingdom 
will face a risk that the foreign fighter (since he is politically motivated), still wants to carry on his 
quest and will want to set up communication lines to mobilise support outside of prison or will 
attempt to radicalise other prisoners they come across. The U.K. therefore has chosen to distribute 
the foreign fighters and terrorists among a small number of high security prisons (Neumann 13). 
The British government prioritises security over rehabilitation. This, is understandable when taking 
into account some of the crimes the foreign fighter have committed, however, when the convicted 
will be released it is important that there is a possibility of reform and rehabilitation, which is 
lacking in the U.K. The approach they take now is a short-term, security focussed solution (ibid.), 
pressured by their citizens (Oehmichen 2009). 
The British government separates the disengagement efforts from the subsequent 
reintegration. They give two main reasons for this separation: the funds that go to counter-terrorism 
and to the Prevent programme should not be used for “activities which have a much broader 
purpose” (HM Government “CONTEST” 61) and the success of reintegration will be mitigated if it 
is labelled as a security issue (ibid.). Instead, the previously mentioned Channel programme is 
responsible for helping “vulnerable” people when they may turn to violent extremism or when they 
want to exit a terrorist group and reintegrate. According to the programme, it focusses on different 
manifestations of terrorism, not solely on Islamic violent extremism; however, since this is 
currently the most significant threat, many of their “Channel referrals” will be focussed on Islamist 
violent extremism (ibid. 11), which can give the Muslim community a feeling of discriminatory 
scrutiny. Additionally, the language of the Channel programme is particularly vague as it has a list 
of twenty-two factors in order to identify vulnerable people, however, “these factors can also be 
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added to and are not considered an exhaustive list” and this list “requires thorough knowledge of 
the individual that may not be available at the point of the referral” (ibid. 12). As a consequence, 
Prevent, and in particular Channel have been accused of turning the British Muslim communities 
into “suspect” communities (Githens-Mazer and Lambert; Pantazis and Pemberton & Awan 
amongst others), which could result in the “alienation of the very people we want to help” (Githens-
Mazer and Lambert 47). In order to hinder alienation, the closest community to the foreign fighter, 
the family, is a salient aspect in the efforts against radicalisation.  
In Denmark the focus seems to be less on punishment despite the first step that is taken 
when foreign fighters return is assessing whether they have committed any crimes while they were 
away, if that is the case then prosecution will follow. As Allan Aarslav, an Aarhus police officer 
said: “first priority is to make sure you’re prosecuted when you get back” (Project Denmark 7). The 
aim is to be righteous but simultaneously to be open for foreign fighters than want to reintegrate 
again, as Aarslav continued: “If you get back and want to get a grip on your old life, we can also 
help you to do that” (ibid.). A telling sign of Denmark’s focus on reintegration is the fact that none 
of the returning foreign fighters so far have been arrested, while most of the 15 fighters that 
returned from Syria or Iraq have been entered into the programme in order to rehabilitate (ibid.). 
This is a strikingly different approach to the homebound foreign fighters than the U.K., as they are 
“embraced” instead of  being “interned for a week while they figure out who [they] are” as is the 
case in the United Kingdom, Canada and the Netherlands (Oppenheimer 2014). Denmark choses to 
focus on reintegration instead of punishment, as they believe this is an approach with a better long 
term effect. 
Isolation in Denmark 
Despite the inexistence of special terrorist sections in Danish prisons a recent shoot-out in a 
Danish café has shown, that radicalisation in prison does occur. The shooter was only released from 
prison two weeks before he attacked and started radicalising six months before he was released 
 17 
(Tange and Doyle). Regardless of this incident, the authorities claim that the contact amongst 
inmates is being monitored extensively (ibid). 
By focussing on a long-term solution, instead of imprisoning the returning foreign fighters, 
reintegration is a big factor in the counter-terrorism efforts of Denmark. The reintegration is seen as 
a salient aspect in preventing future terrorist attacks. Upon return, the foreign fighters are screened 
for trauma’s and radicalisation (Briggs and Silverman 47) and are offered psychological treatment if 
this has indeed occurred (Project Denmark 6) Additionally, they are offered medical treatment for 
the possible war wounds they have suffered (ibid.) and the foreign fighters are given advice on 
education, employment and housing services. One example is the case of ‘Omar’ as described by 
Naik et al. for the CNN; Omar left to fight against the Syrian President Bashar al – Assad (2014).  
He was disillusioned by what he encountered in Syria and decided to return without having any fear 
for his government. Omar is now back at his university where he is continuing his study in 
engineering, just like 10 other returned foreign fighters are back at school or have a job (Naik et al. 
2014). This approach tries to tackle the radicalisation at its roots – the feeling of exclusion, the 
divide between ‘us’ and ‘them’. 
Family	  and	  (Religious)	  Community	  
Surprisingly, the Prevent programme of the U.K. does not mention family, neither parents nor 
brothers or sisters. In the umbrella programme of CONTEST, family or any other biological 
relation is not stated and when looking at the reintegration strand, Channel, the same striking 
absence is found, the family is not even cited amongst the possible actors that could “identify the 
vulnerable suspect”. The only time family is mentioned in the Channel programme, is regarding 
support for the family in the form of formal parenting programmes. As Prevent claims to be 
focussed on strengthening the community and on  working together with the community, leaving 
out the family is peculiar, especially as it was considered a “success- factor” in Yemen and Saudi 
Arabia (Jones 2013). As the MI5 already reported in 2008, many terrorists have a normal family 
(Travis 2008) and are unknown to the security services before they travel to Syria or Iraq (Casciani 
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2014). Families can play a significant role since family members can be aware of the violent 
extremist aspirations of their husband/wife, brother/sister, son or daughter (Travis 2008).  
Oppositely, in Denmark, the inclusion of parents is seen as a key point in the disengagement 
strategy, similarly to Yemen and Saudi Arabia, and therefore preventive efforts (Government of 
Denmark “Common and Safe Future” 29); subsequently, one of the central initiatives of the 
program is the strengthening of parent responsibility. The government implemented a dialogue and 
counselling tool for professionals that have contact with parents and also strives to give parents the 
incentive to raise their children as responsible citizens by tightening parent liability for damages 
cause by their children (ibid. 14). When the foreign fighter would be joining the “back on track” 
programme in the prison, families will also be involved in the supporting and reintegration of the 
individual (Government of Denmark “ Denmark's Deradicalisation Efforts” 14). Additionally, 
parents will be offered counselling when their child has decided to join the fight in Syria and they 
will be involved in the forming of a network around the individual who is joining a disengagement 
programme. As the family is given such a prominent role in the disengagement process of a 
returned foreign fighter it is important to take into account that families may have been the breeding 
ground for the violent extremism (Davis and Cragin 92), similarly with (religious) communities 
where the foreign fighters spend most their time. Family is not the only community a foreign fighter 
has, as friends, mosques and educational institutions are in contact with the individual for a large 
share of their time. 
Even though Prevent does not collaborate with family, much of the Prevent strand’s focus is 
on collaboration with Muslim communities, particularly in cities such as Birmingham and London 
(Halliday and Dodd 2015): “The Government must help mobilise communities and empower them 
to challenge terrorism” (HM Government “CONTEST” 63). By analysing the Prevent strategy I 
assume that the communities they want to mobilise are the Muslim communities, as they say:  “We 
will not want to engage in matters of theology but we recognise the imperative for theologians, 
academics and communities to do so” (ibid.) and as they explained that currently the main focus is 
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on Islamic radicalisation (HM Government “CONTEST” 11). Nonetheless, as discussed in the 
reintegration section, not everyone appreciates this focus on Muslim communities. One in-depth 
study on the impact of counter-terrorism measures on Muslim communities found that counter-
terrorism law and policy contributed to hostility towards Muslims as it created a climate of fear and 
suspicion towards them (Choudhury and Fenwick v)1. Similarly, Imran Awan claims that violent 
extremism is linked to the Muslim religion by the government (1158) and Pantazis and Pemberton 
claim that within the United Kingdom “Islamic fanaticism” has replaced the Irish as the new 
“enemy within” (646). However, as Prevent has had valuable tips from the community that stopped 
terrorist attacks (HM Government “CONTEST” 68), contacts with the community are being 
established and cherished in order to keep a good relationship and information line going. 
Communities can be important in recognising radicalisation but can also play a role in the 
surveillance of a returning foreign fighter when the individual is reintegrating into the community. 
In order to engage the Muslim community to speak out against joining the militant Jihad in 
Syria and Iraq, the PET – Denmark’s intelligence service has set up a dialogue forum between PET 
and the communities; this way they facilitate discussion and cooperation (Project Denmark 6). In 
recent months, the public statements made by prominent figures of the Muslim community have 
increased (Briggs and Silverman 25). Additionally, In order to preventively fight radicalisation, the 
Safe and Common Future plan set up a cooperation between the schools, social services and the 
police (SSP) (Government of Denmark “Common and Safe Future” 13). This has been adopted by 
the Aarhus model, which also uses SSP to detect radicalisation quicker. Even though research has 
pointed out that Danes as well as immigrants have a high degree of trust in the police (Lindekilde 
and Sedgwick 40), among male immigrant descendants, the share that has experienced 
discrimination by the police once a year or more, is no less than 38% (ibid. 42). This is a worrying 
trend, as ethnic profiling by the police could undermine the efforts of the Danish programme to 
incorporate the radicalised in the “democratic community” as this could enhance exactly the 
                                                
1 Similar research has been done by Githens-Mazer and Lambert with London as a case study in 
their research ‘Islamophobia and anti-muslim hate crime’ for the University of Exeter 
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opposite and stigmatise and estrange the Muslim community. An example of the stigmatising 
practices by the U.K. can be seen in the manner they arranged the surveillance around the home-
bound foreign fighter. 
Surveillance	  
When the foreign fighters return from Syria and Iraq or when they are released from prison and 
want to get back to their old lives, it is important that the reintegration into the community runs 
smoothly; this is the concern of the Pursue strand in the U.K and is covered by the “Common and 
Safe Future” – plan in Denmark. Over the next four years, thirty-four terrorism-related prisoners 
may reach their release dates in the U.K., and according to Pursue it is important that “their 
subsequent supervision manages the risks they may pose” (HM Government “CONTEST” 51). 
Besides this brief mention of supervision, neither in CONTEST, Prevent, Channel, nor any other 
part of the counter terrorism body speaks about surveillance. However, it is known that in the name 
of Prevent, counter terrorism funds were used to pay for CCTV cameras in a Muslim community in 
Birmingham where 72 cameras were hidden (Casciani 2014). First of all, this is against the human 
right to privacy (Miller 97) and secondly, actions like this give the Prevent strand a negative 
perception and give Muslims the idea that the government is spying on them, which makes them 
distrust the government (Halliday and Dodd 2015). Instead, a better approach than spying on a 
community from a distance would be to engage in dialogue with the community in order to 
understand their grievances, as currently most people employed for Prevent, do not understand the 
community they are working with (ibid.). 
In Denmark, in public places such as squares, traffic junctions and malls, the police can set 
up a CCTV surveillance (PET). However, individual surveillance is incorporated in the 
disengagement programmes as parents and other family members will be in touch with 
professionals and as these programmes are designed to set up a network around the foreign fighters 
(Government of Denmark “Common and Safe Future” 29). Additionally Briggs and Silverman 
foresee that there would not be enough resources for individual surveillance of every returning 
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foreign fighter (39), as the constant surveillance of an individual takes about 30 experts (Gidda). 
Nonetheless, in the name of counter-terrorism, the rules for the Danish intelligence bureau (PET), 
regarding the collection of information concerning people of interest, have introduced greater 
flexibility. This enlargement of the powers of intelligence services has previously been questioned 
by scholars, as they may infringe on the right of privacy (Koop et al & Schilten) and as these 
emergency measures may be made permanent measures (Bradley Bamford 2010). This is especially 
so in combination with the ethnic profiling by the police, which may be going on in the 
communities in the name of preventive measures, this may result in disrespecting human rights. 
Instead of keeping the foreign fighter in check by surveillance, dialogue has been suggested to be a 
large contributor to the disengagement of foreign fighters (Birk 3) as it addresses the grievances and 
the roots of the terrorist activities instead of curing only the symptoms.  
Dialogue	  
Nonetheless, in the CONTEST programme of the U.K., dialogue is only mentioned in regards to the 
collaboration of faith groups and local policing, or in regards to the communication between the 
police, security and intelligence agencies (HM Government “CONTEST” 11). Despite the 
importance of  this communication in order for the counter-terrorism efforts to be successful, the 
dialogue with the violent extremist is not mentioned. While (religious) dialogue with the individual 
is important in Denmark, and many other countries such as Yemen and Saudi Arabia (Birk 3), the 
British choose another approach. Even though the CONTEST programme does not engage in 
dialogue, the government does support local faith groups that do engage in dialogue, such as the 
Active Change Foundation (ACF) and the Quilliam Foundation (Rabasa et al. 133). The ACF is 
actively engaged in de-radicalisation through personal contact and is led by individuals with 
personal experience in gang culture and violent extremism (Ibid. 134). Additionally, the U.K. tries 
to construct a counter narrative to the violent extremism through a one-way channel. This is shown 
particularly in their choice of words as they claim to do research in order to understand the 
“audience” better (HM Government “CONTEST” 61). An audience is passive, listening and not 
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contributing to the ‘play’, instead it is watching. When looking at the other countries I found that 
one of the issues with, for example, the Yemeni approach of dialogue was that the dialogue was not 
between two equal participants (Birk 17). If the British approach is purely the government talking 
and the “audience” supposedly listening, this does not construct two equal participants in order to 
change the violent extremist ideology; therefore they may be facing the same problems soon. 
Phil Edwards claims that turning away from terrorism can be comparable to turning away 
from gangs or criminal circuits; in order to do so, the foreign fighter must be extremely positive 
about the future and they must make a transition from its past to the future, it should be a fluent 
transition and not a sudden break (60). Changing one’s ideas through constructing a narrative and 
forming a new identity, building on the past while feeling currently enlightened, is key (60). 
Dialogue can play a salient part in this construction of an identity; additionally therapy can be used 
for this purpose, which will be discussed in the next section. 
In the reintegration section it has been shown that dialogue is an important aspect of the 
Danish disengagement programme. They believe that much of the extremist views held by the 
foreign fighters are due to the narrating of one-sided stories and the emphasising of an ‘us’ and 
‘them’ divide (Government of Denmark “Common and Safe Future” 15). In order to facilitate two-
way discussions the programme has set up internet forums (ibid. 20) and foreign fighters that come 
back will be put in contact with a psychologist and a mentor (Agershou 10). The Danish 
Government takes an interesting stance regarding the dialogues they enter with the returning foreign 
fighters, as their programme does not try to alter the ideology of the militant Jihadists (Project 
Denmark 7). As one of the rehabilitators said “[y]ou are welcome to dream of the Caliphate. But 
there are some means that you cannot use according to the penal code here. You can be al-Shabab 
all you like, as long as you don't actually do al-Shabab” (Nielsen qtd. in Project Denmark 7), this 
shows that the Danish government has a focus on the disengagement as defined by John Horgan. 
The only thing they do try to challenge is the ‘us’ and ‘them’ divide, in order to make the foreign 
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fighters see that they need to pursue their wishes through the democratic means of a shared and 
diverse community (Government of Denmark, “Common and Safe Future” 8). 
Therapy,	  education,	  finances	  and	  aftercare	  
Therapy and counselling are not mentioned in either the Prevent strand of the CONTEST 
programme, or in the rest of the CONTEST programme, contrasted by the large role these play in 
the reintegration of the foreign fighter in the disengagement efforts of Denmark. However, in the 
Channel programme, which tries to channel individuals out of violent extremism, social workers 
can be used in the package that is set up as soon as (a possible) radicalisation is recognised. These 
social workers can also collaborate with prisons (HM government “Channel” 8) and can include 
supporting mentor contact, anger management sessions, cognitive behavioural therapies and work 
on life skills, such as dealing with peer pressure (ibid. 21). Nonetheless, in Denmark there is a 
stronger focus on therapy; when a foreign fighter returns to Denmark, the individual will go through 
an extensive screening. Once it is found that the individual is traumatised, therapy will be available. 
A psychologist, mentor and a network of family will work together to rehabilitate the foreign 
fighter (Project Denmark 6). Additionally, the returning foreign fighter will be advised on education 
or a job and helped back into a routine in order function well in the Danish society, such as Omar 
(Naik et al. 2014), who is continuing his engineering study at his previous university.  
Education, as opposed to therapy takes on an important role in the counter-terrorism efforts 
of the United Kingdom in two ways: Firstly, the educational institutions are in contact with the 
Channel police practitioner in order to recognise radicalising or radicalised individuals (HM 
Government “Channel” 13). Secondly, in constructing a counter-narrative, the sector of education is 
of significant importance, as young individuals spend most of their time in these institutions. As the 
CONTEST programme claims: “The new Prevent strategy will identify more projects in education, 
communities and the criminal justice system which enable people to effectively challenge terrorist 
ideology” (HM Government “CONTEST” 63).  
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Channel plays an important role for the U.K. in helping foreign fighters after they went to 
prison or after they de-radicalised, as an exit programme. Following their conviction their money 
and possessions in relation to terrorist acts can be seized by the government (Alexander and 
Brenner 94). Once they leave prison, the Channel programme could help them rehabilitate through 
their supportive package, e.g. through education skills contact, through careers contact or family 
support contact and housing support contact. In Denmark, the aftercare takes on a more important 
role in the disengagement, as the reintegration and acceptation into society will diminish the ‘us’ 
and ‘them’ divide between the Danes and returning foreign fighters. “For returnees there is a form 
of aftercare that among other things may have consisted of debriefing, a session with a psychologist 
medical care, mentor contact and participation in an exit programme” (Agershou 10), such as the 
Aarhus pilot programme. 
Terminology	  
Prevent has been scrutinised for its terminology since its inauguration (Rabasa et al. 136; Edwards 
49; Pantazis and Pemberton 646; O’Toole et al. 1), and has consequently been adjusted. 
Nonetheless, when analysing the programme and its terminology, many underlying, worrying 
assumptions come forth. In the Prevent strand of CONTEST it is written that: “greater effort will be 
focussed on responding to the ideological challenge” (italics added) (HM Government 
“CONTEST” 6) and as seen before in the punishment section, the United Kingdom would like to 
prosecute, even when terrorist actions have not yet occurred. Focussing on ‘not yet’ actions and 
ideology, can lead to dangerous presumptions; when fighting an ideology, one has to fight the 
thoughts of the radicalised individual, since the government has more authority than the foreign 
fighter or any other citizen, the government can make thoughts punishable. This falls in line with 
Phil Edwards’ claims when he writes that just ideologically supporting terrorism is enough to be 
labelled a criminal (57). Therefore, the authorities have now given themselves the responsibility of 
“policing thought”, the ideological counter terrorism means that even individuals supporting 
terrorism need to abandon their ideas and that this is the state’s responsibility (ibid.).  
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Additionally, the title of the Channel programme reads: “protecting vulnerable people from 
being drawn into terrorism” (HM Government “Channel” 1). As Jacques Derrida argues, when 
deconstructing sentences, very often there is an assumption of a power structure to be found 
(Zehfuss 205), as is the case in this title. Protecting someone entails that the subject that needs 
protection is not capable of protection itself, which subsequently means they are weaker than the 
one protecting. This results in giving the protector, in this case the government, power over the 
protected. Likewise, when talking of vulnerable people, the people radicalised or possibly becoming 
radicalised, this again points at the weakness of people falling for radicalisation, not taking into 
account the grievances these subject may have which makes them more prone to radicalise. 
In the common and safe future – plan of Denmark, there is no specific mention of a Muslim 
community, instead, it talks about strengthening the “sense of community” (Government of 
Denmark, “Common and Safe Future” 16) and the “democratic community” (ibid. 20). This use of 
the term community is less divisive than the term Muslim communities, as this will strengthen the 
‘us’ and ‘them’ divide. Additionally, the programme speaks of rights and obligations for all Danish 
citizens, this strengthens the position of Muslim Danes as they do not just have rights, that need to 
be protected, they don’t just have obligations without enjoying the benefits of belonging to the 
Danish society, they are part of society and will therefore have to participate in order to receive. 
III. Analysing	  the	  underlying	  Paradigms	  of	  the	  U.K.	  and	  Denmark	  
For both the United Kingdom and Denmark, there is a political pressure to do something, and 
do it quickly in this “War on Terror” (Oehmichen 2009). This term, War on Terror already indicates 
that the situation the countries are in are exceptional and therefore special counter-terrorism 
measures are allowed, especially when attacks occur (McGhee 37). While in Denmark the newly 
built counter-terrorism disengagement efforts are built upon already existing crime-preventing 
schemes (Government of Denmark “Common and Safe Future” 6), in the United Kingdom it is a 
newly set up programme specifically focussed on the current threat of terrorism and returning 
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foreign fighters. The analysis has shown throughout that both the U.K. and Denmark try to reach 
disengagement, however, the U.K. stresses punishment more whereas Denmark sees reintegration 
as an important preventive measure and therefore focusses more on reintegration. 
One prominent aspect of the British efforts is the corporation with the Muslim community. This 
approach fits within their earlier presented “Big Society”, where the citizens take their own 
initiative and together build a stronger society (Briggs 971). There is nothing wrong with this 
approach, as Civil Society in many fields, such as development aid, is a popular concept (White 
375). Nonetheless, as discussed in the section of (religious) community in chapter two, the focus on 
Muslim communities has contributed to hostility towards Muslims as it created a climate of fear and 
suspicion towards them (Choudhury and Fenwick v) and has replaced the Irish as the “enemy 
within” (Pantazis and Pemberton 646). McGhee correctly argues that the Muslims in Great Britain 
are now seen as “conditional citizens”, as they are prone to terrorism and fundamentalism (McGhee 
37). In fact, McGhee argues that the British programme is anti-multiculturalism (145), as in 
CONTEST British values are the most important rules to adhere to and extremism is defined as the 
“vocal or active opposition to fundamental British values” (HM Government “CONTEST” 62). 
When these are upheld and shared by everyone, a safe future will be guaranteed. 
When the goal of CONTEST and Prevent is to guarantee a safe future, two things seem to be 
wrong with this approach. First of all, the problem of the conditional citizens ensures an ‘us’ and 
‘them’ divide; those who agree and adhere belong in Great Britain, the others simply don’t. This is 
seen in the approach of stripping British citizens with dual citizenship of their British passport, even 
though they might have any ties to the country of their second citizenship (McGhee 47). As Briggs 
and Silverman agreeably argue: “While this is understandable, it is important to face facts: we 
cannot arrest our way out of the problem, we don’t have the resources to mount surveillance 
operations against all suspected or returning foreign fighters, and we cannot stop most foreign 
fighters from coming home” (49) 
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Additionally, ‘the conditional citizen’ makes way for a viewing of Muslims in a “good 
Muslim – bad Muslim” way, as described by Mamdani (767), rather than viewing the individuals as 
terrorists or citizens. This, according to Mamdani implies that Islam should be quarantined (766), 
instead of incorporated into society, it is a two level approach of ‘Othering’, dividing the world in 
‘us’ and ‘them’. Firstly, it separates the conditional citizen from the Brit; secondly, within the 
conditional citizen the “bad” and the “good” ones are distinguished. This underlying bias of the 
British counter-terrorism programmes is problematic. A multicultural society, to me, seems like a 
higher goal to aim for than eliminating certain groups from society, if it doesn’t fit traditional 
values. “Who is a citizen?” was answered by Balibar as “a free man simply because he is equal to 
any other man” (45).    
The second problematic concept with Prevent is that, vocally disagreeing with British values 
is seen as unacceptable. As Phil Edwards argues, Prevent is “isolating, stigmatising and penalising 
non-violent extremism” (68). This change of focus from penalising an individual after a crime has 
been committed, to pre-crime penalising is dangerous, as it is policing thoughts and ‘not yet’ 
actions; this is almost an Orwellian style of policing thought. Thereby, as Balibar argues that racism 
is primarily a political concept (1631) and as Fanon claims that racism is a social concept – 
individuals are racist because their societies are (Fanon 85)– strengthening this ‘us’ and ‘them’ 
divide and seeing the Muslim individuals as “conditional citizens” is dangerous and will not fare 
well for a long term solution to the threat of terrorism, especially as perceived threat of identity is of 
central importance for radicalising individuals (Moghaddam 71). The 72 hidden cameras in the 
Muslim community in Birmingham, as mentioned in chapter 2, will only strengthen this threat to 
identity and the ‘us’ and ‘them’ divide. Similarly to the one-way counter-narrative the United 
Kingdom has constructed; they send counter-messages into the world without listening to the 
grievances of the radicalised terrorists and foreign fighters. 
 Moreover, the British government does not mention its’ own history in the Middle East in 
any programme of CONTEST, channel or prevent, while the United Kingdom’s presence in the 
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Middle East can be a legitimate ground for grievance and anger amongst the foreign fighters that 
leave the United Kingdom. Ignoring the history may only further build up these emotions, as well 
as the consequent focus on religious dialogue instead of political dialogue, such as Reza Aslan 
suggested (2009). Add the vague terminology, which is open for interpretation and the lack of 
transparency (Project Contest 10), to this equation and it is clear that the result will not be an 
improvement on the threat of terrorism.  
The Danish counter terrorism package mentions the Muslim community less, instead 
providing a wider focus on other crimes, such as gang criminality, thereby avoiding the perceived 
labelling of the Muslim community as “the bad guys”, instead choosing to label the criminals as 
such. Yet, both the British government and the Danish government have been criticised for 
branding the Muslim community in a negative light, as the focus on Islamist terrorism by media, 
politicians and in the public debate “stigmatises entire communities as potentially dangerous” 
(Lindekilde and Sedgwick 58). Notwithstanding the public debate, this can also be due to the 
preventative character of the Danish programme as the SSP (school, social service, police) are 
being trained in order to recognise radicalisation, even though teachers protest and claim that they 
are not a “terrorist detector” (Lindekilde 114). Due to the focus being placed on Islamist terrorism, 
this detecting of radicalising youth opens the way for discrimination by teachers, police and social 
services, which in turn will enlarge the ‘us’ and ‘them’ division and the feeling of exclusion 
amongst the Muslim youth. Additionally, this preventative character, occurring also in the U.K.’s 
approach, may infringe upon the right to freedom of speech and thought (Miller 97), as the Muslim 
youth are being scrutinised for their speech and behaviour. 
 Moreover, Lindekilde criticises the forums that have been set up by the Danish government 
as intended to get a one-way information flow going (115). However, I argue that even if the 
platforms may be intended to get information flowing towards radicalised youth, or youth prone to 
radicalisation, it may still be of use for individuals to tell their story and to have a platform to talk 
about their political or any other grievances, as these are often at the roots of radicalisation; the key 
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to any successful initiative seems to be addressing both the way of thinking and the circumstances 
of the individual (Barrett and Bokhari 180). As Mahmood Mamdani claims, Islam nowadays equals 
the Middle East and the other way around and the way people write about them it seems like 
Muslims don’t have a history, politics or debates, instead, they should be saved from the outside 
(767). To counter this narrative of Muslims equalling the Middle East, while the West equals the 
outside saviours, platforms such as this can be a start in order to open up dialogues, as I am of the 
opinion that dialogue can wipe out stereotypes and abstract pictures of complete cultures. 
 A possible pitfall in the Danish approach to radicalisation may be the strong focus on 
integration and the subsequent securitisation of integration. Muslims may find that having a Salafi 
interpretation of the Islam, supporting certain political groups, or sympathising with the grievances 
of terrorists are seen as a lack of integration into the majority society and additionally are seen as a 
security issue (Lindekilde and Sedgwick 61). Consequently, Muslims that do not conform to the 
norms of the  the majority are seen as a risk to society, which I argue, indirectly contrasts with the 
human right to freedom of speech, thought and action, as many counter-terrorism efforts do (Miller 
97). 
Since most the foreign fighters are immigrants or second-degree immigrants (Bakker 43), it 
is not strange that Muslim communities receive the greatest attention. However, Denmark 
distinguishes themselves from other counter-terrorism programmes, such as the British efforts, by 
incorporating terrorism with already existing crimes, such as gang crime, robbery and drug abuse. 
This makes sure that there is a division made between criminals and non-criminals instead of 
between Muslims, who form a risk, and ethnic Danes. The distinction between a religion and an 
ethnicity may sound counterintuitive however, unfortunately, this is often the case, as immigrants 
from Arab countries equal Muslims who equal a risk and Danes equals non-Muslims who equal 
safety. This falls in line with Balibar’s claim that racism is primarily a political concept (1631), 
racism is not about a race anymore but can now be about the individual (religious) convictions one 
might have that differs from the majority. 
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 Even though this division may not sound through the Common and Safe Future – plan, 
there has been much critique on the anti-terrorism packages of Denmark, as they don’t entail 
“sunset clauses”. Where in Great Britain, the “emergency” legislation has an end-term, a sunset, 
build in, Denmark lacks these clauses and can therefore change legislation in the name of the “War 
on Terror” and under the pretence of a “state of emergency”, whilst they will stay in place 
permanently (Lindekilde and Sedgwick 18). As Denmark is expanding its’ inspections zones in for 
example Copenhagen (ibid. 12), this is exactly the picture that Marcel ten Hooven (2014), Wardell 
(2014) and Bradley Bamford (2010) paint and warned for as this can have far-reaching 
consequences for civil liberties and rights in the long run (2010). 
Additionally, and similarly to the U.K., Denmark has been criticised for its lack of 
transparency and its lacking mechanisms of accountability, as controversial, secret evidence has 
been used to lock four young men up for the planning of an attack (Lindekilde and Sedgwick 
25,37). This seems a comparable approach to the U.K. and as discussed in the U.K. aspect of the 
analysis, the policing of thought and ‘not yet’ actions is a dangerous road to go down (Edwards 68), 
especially when using controversial evidence in the process. 
IV. Conclusion	  
“Whatever we may think of their methods, terrorists have a cause, and a need to be heard” 
(Mahmood Mamdani 773) 
 
After analysing the different components for the British and the Danish programmes, two aspects 
became instantly noticeable. Firstly, the U.K.’s programme, consisting of CONTEST – pursue, 
prevent, protect, prepare- and Channel, focusses on punishment, forged, probably under the 
pressure of its citizens whom out of fear call for quick measures to be taken (Oehmichen 2009), 
which resulted in success in the fight against terrorists and foreign fighters being measured through 
the high conviction rate. Oppositely, their reintegration section is vague and open for discriminatory 
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actions, which have indeed happened. In incorporating the community, the U.K. has failed, as the 
Muslims feel isolated and non-Muslims start seeing them as “the enemy within”, which results in 
discriminatory practices against a complete religion, where it is the task of Muslims to prove that 
they are not the “bad Muslim”. Examples such as the case of the 72 hidden cameras, paid for by 
Prevent’s budget, obviously do not help the U.K’s case. Additionally, the “dialogue” set up by the 
British government is very much a one-way stream of information, without listening to the 
grievances of the foreign fighters and their reasons for doing what they did. Throughout the whole 
set of programmes from the U.K. an old, still surviving power-structure becomes clear; the West, 
the British, need to help the Muslims, the vulnerable people, however vague and broad these 
concepts may be, this seems to be the underlying paradigm. 
 Secondly, in the set of programmes in Denmark - the Common and Safe Future- plan, back 
on track –prison plan and the disengagement pilot programme of Aarhus - reintegration is the main 
focus. Of the returning foreign fighters, none have been arrested so far. This shows that for the 
Danish authorities a homebound foreign fighter is innocent till proven otherwise, as opposed to the 
foreign fighter to the British authorities, where leaving to Syria or Iraq is enough reason to be found 
guilty. Nonetheless, research shows that racism and discriminatory practices are also present in 
Denmark, which is enhanced by the role schools, social services and police (SSP) must play, in 
order to “detect” radicalising young Muslims. This may result in a fear for a fundamentalist 
interpretation of the Islam, as this is seen as opposing the Danish values and anyone who do not 
want to conform to the ‘Danishness’ defined in opposition of the fundamental Islam, are shown 
little tolerance (Lindekilde and Sedgwick 55); thus, little space is left for non-violent fundamentalist 
Muslims.  
 Even though these programmes differ in their approach and their foci, I found a common 
problem, best described by Mahmood Mamdani’s concept of “Culture Talk”. Contemporary culture 
talk has “turned religious experience into a political category, differentiating “good Muslims” from 
“bad Muslims” rather than terrorists from civilians” (Mamdani 766). This culture talk “de-
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historicises” the construction of political identities, which appears to be a result of these 
programmes as well. Terrorism, as defined by Schmid, has a political goal and can be seen on can 
be seen as the result of colonialist practices in the Middle East (ibid. 773). Cold Warriors turned 
traditional institutions such as Jihad Akbar and madressas, and traditional stimulants such as 
opium, to modern political purposes on a scale previously unimagined, with devastating 
consequences (ibid. 774). When the history and the responsibility of the countries directly or 
indirectly involved in these issues are not addressed, it will be impossible to change the focus from 
military to a solely political conflict (ibid. 773). 
 As a big reason for radicalisation is a perceived threat to one’s identity (Moghaddam 71), 
instead of “spying” on Muslims and branding a whole community, real dialogue should be opened 
in order to counter the narrative constructed by the media, politicians and the public debates that 
stigmatise entire communities as potentially dangerous (Lindekilde and Sedgwick 58). I argue that, 
when combining the claim of Balibar, that racism is a political concept with the claim of Fanon that 
individuals are racist because their societies are (85), something is fundamentally wrong in the 
Danish and British perception of Muslims, terrorists and foreign fighters and this is shown in their 
counter-terrorism programmes. I argue that inherent racial undertones exist in both governments’ 
programmes as they juxtapose the Islamic community with non-Islamic Danish or British citizens 
by formulating religious experience into a political category (Mamdani 766). Meaningful dialogue 
between Muslims and their governments as two equal counter-parts is lacking in both the 
programmes. Despite the appearance of progress through the creation of online forums, the 
intention, however, is to establish a one-way stream of information. 
 In sum, both governments are overtly focusing on religion, and are tactically ignoring the 
history, thereby renouncing it as a political issue and placing the blame with the whole of the 
Muslim community and Islam. As opposed to the fable at the beginning of my thesis, the 
relationship between the governments and the Muslim community is not that of a sun or wind and a 
man who is passively undergoing the moods of the weather. Instead, the man and the sun are on an 
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equal pedestal, equally influencing each other. What I wish to achieve with that fable, however, is 
to show that punishing a man for closing his coat by blowing more and stronger wind, is not going 
to change the situation, it will instead lead to escalation. Criminal deeds do need to be penalised 
severely in case of terrorist attacks, however, punishing without listening, or punishing regardless 
of what a foreign fighter has done, says or hopes to achieve, is not going to get Great Britain or 
Denmark anywhere. I argue for dialogue and the incorporation of Muslims into the politics of both 
countries, where they need to be equal to any British or Danish politician when elected by the 
citizens, or when they are not elected that the politicians take their concerns into account. 
 To end on a more casual note and point towards a campaign that, at the moment of writing, 
will be introduced in the New York trains shortly. This campaign consists of posters projecting 
messages about Muslims that counter the stereotypical, oriental view held by many. One example is 
of the poster that reads: “They invented coffee, the toothbrush and algebra”, followed by a text at 
the bottom saying: "Oh wait, sorry about the algebra. That's a year of class you'll never get back" 
(Swann 2015). With humour, this campaign shows how peculiar the prevailing view of Muslims as 
a danger to “Western” society is and I strongly urge people, media and politicians to stop ignoring 
history and to start collaborating with Muslims as an equal part of society. This should be done in 
order to shape our society as beneficial for Muslims and all religions alike and encourage the media 
to counter the stereotypical narrative about Muslims through campaigns such as these. 
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